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Economic Crisis and Innovativeness –
Exploring Geographies of Impact
Martina Fromhold-Eisebith and Günter Eisebith
Wirtschaftskrise und Innovativität –
zur Geographie der Wirkungszusammenhänge
The paper explores, mainly from a conceptual angle, regional differences in interdependencies
between the recent economic crisis and innovativeness in advanced economies. It addresses two
directions of causal relationships between these process fields: In which respects are regional
economies more vulnerable or resistant in the face of the crisis, due to their specific constellations
of innovativeness? And how does the crisis, in turn, affect regional innovativeness, which may be
subject to both hampering and encouraging forces? Arguments that ‘geography matters’ are elabo-
rated by referring to two perspectives, one taking account of regional structure in terms of industry
composition, and another one considering region-specific systemic qualities.
 1. Introduction
While financial markets, banks and real estate
have received major attention both as key driv-
ers or culprits and, simultaneously, as victims of
the worldwide economic crisis that started in
2008 (Krugman 2008; Soros 2009), implica-
tions for other facets of economic development
have rarely been explored from an academic
viewpoint so far. The media have extensively re-
ported on swelling bankruptcies and contracting
industrial production, trade and GDP in many
advanced economies. Yet, important mecha-
nisms behind such dynamics deserve more
scholarly attention. This calls for research
approaches that reach beyond the aggregate view
of economics on the crisis and its outcomes. The
perspective of economic geography suits well to
add necessary dimensions of assessment, look-
ing at place-specific implications (Aalbers
2009; Wuttke 2009). Interdependencies be-
tween economic, political, social, and technolog-
ical aspects of crisis-driven development must
be regarded, including different scales of activ-
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ity from the corporate to the regional and up to
the national and international levels.
In this context the question of how the recent
crisis intervenes with innovativeness seems to
be of particular interest, with innovations under-
stood as “a new or significantly improved prod-
uct (good or service), or process, a new market-
ing method, or a new organisational method in
business practices, workplace organisation or ex-
ternal relations” (OECD and Eurostat 2005: 46).
This holds true both for academic reasoning and
political considerations. First, innovativeness is
shaped by factors that do not follow simple logics
of ‘shrinking economy = shrinking R&D’, but
is formed by a set of various, sometimes contra-
dicting forces that challenge academic debate.
Second, innovativeness is internationally ac-
knowledged as playing a major role in allowing
economic actors to overcome the downturn
(OECD 2009a) and may, in fact, be seen as the
reason why several economies, notably Germany,
have managed to already recover from the reces-
sion. This is why we need to know more about the
complex relationship between economic depres-
sion and innovativeness, and its determinants. The
regional level plays a crucial role in this regard:
Different companies react differently to the cri-
sis in terms of innovation behaviour, which trans-
lates into spatial variations of impact.
The topic bears additional appeal as causalities
between innovativeness and crisis can be regard-
ed from opposite directions: Not only is it worth-
while to examine the impact of the crisis on inno-
vativeness, but also to consider the role of inno-
vativeness in determining the affectedness of
firms and regions by the crisis (see Fig. 1). No
matter which perspective is employed, the answer
always implies contrasting options. The econom-
ic crisis may both hamper and inspire innovative-
ness. Highly innovative firms can be more vulner-
able to the economic downturn or more robust and
flexible than less innovative ones. The detailed
nature of such relationships, their positive or neg-
ative twist, seems to depend on a combination of
factors that reflect, among others, sector- and
region-specific settings.
This paper explores relevant interdependencies.
After broadly discussing links between economic
depression and innovativeness drawing on re-
search literature, it develops a conceptual
framework that highlights which factors shape
place-specific relationships of crisis and in-
novativeness, mainly referring to the situation
of advanced European economies. These con-
siderations are underscored by some anec-
dotal evidence from recent studies and media
reports. Altogether, the paper cannot avoid
being more conceptual and predictive than an-
alytical, due to the unfinished state of evolving
processes and limited availability of current
data on innovation indicators.
2. Economic Depression and Innovativeness –
an Underconceptualised Topic
While there is a rich tradition of research on the
impact of longer-term industrial downturns on
regional development in a broader perspective,
the interplay of recession and corporate or re-
gional innovativeness has rarely been explored.
Phenomena of economic decline due to struc-
tural imbalances and the loss of competitive
edge against competitors in the globalising
economy have been subject to investigations es-
pecially with respect to regions in Germany, the
United Kingdom and the USA for quite some
time (see, for instance, Barnes and Gertler
2002; Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Meyer and
Muschwitz 2008; Mounfield 1984; Norcliff et
al. 1986;  Plahuta and Halder 2006). Innovation
has entered this debate mainly as a means to
overcome structural problems, hence as a ma-
jor ingredient to be incorporated in regional
development policies. This applies also to the
recently revitalised debate on ‘regional resil-
ience’, which sees innovation as one element
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within a portfolio of activities that allow for regional
adaptability in the face of economic shocks (Pike
et al. 2010). Yet, the direct interdependencies be-
tween short- to medium- term forces of recession
and the innovation behaviour of regional sets of
companies has not been addressed in these works.
In fact, surprisingly little has been written by aca-
demic scholars on the impact of economic de-
cline on innovativeness; there is no consistent
theory so far. Even Nobel laureate Krugman’s
book (2008), which promises to deliver the lat-
est on ‘depression economics’, remains silent on
the issue, just as recently published monographs
on the economics of innovation (Swann 2009).
Only a few studies have explicitly focused on this
issue so far (Archibugi and Filipetti 2011; Kan-
erva and Hollanders 2009). A reason is proba-
bly that hitherto the notion of innovativeness has
so firmly been connected with a paradigm of in-
dustrial growth and business expansion that hardly
anybody considered opposite logics ever to mat-
ter. The research gap may also be explained by the
fact that, before the recent crisis, the world has
rarely seen ‘top innovative’ Western economies
suffer as badly as now. This is why suddenly the
‘club’ of leading economies, the OECD, has
churned out several writings on the topic (OECD
2009a, 2009b, 2009c). Nevertheless, scientific
discourse offers but a small set of arguments so
far that spotlight how economic downturn and
innovativeness essentially relate to each other.
We can draw on earlier debates in economics
about the long-term cyclic nature of innovative-
ness itself, in terms of Kondratieff or Schum-
peterian waves (Kleinknecht 1987). According-
ly, every few decades a bundle of radical inno-
vations set off an economic boom that is based
on the implementation, proliferating economic
exploitation and incremental improvement of
those innovations. The upswing is followed by
phases of stagnation and downturn until another
cluster of radical innovations instigates a new
cycle start. There is statistical evidence that
basic innovations actually tend to emerge in
waves, entailing economic acceleration (Klein-
knecht 1990). In our context it is even more
interesting to think about what happens at the
dusk of a technological-economic cycle (leav-
ing open whether the end of the still young
‘5th Kondratieff’ has really already been
reached). It may be hypothesised that this pro-
vides just the right ‘depression trigger’ needed
for stimulating increased investments into in-
novation bases that, subsequently, carry busi-
nesses out of the deceleration (Kleinknecht
1987). Many firms are born or upgraded in the
‘creative destruction’ of downturns; new busi-
ness models and technologies arise, particularly
when allowing cost reductions (OEDC 2009a).
This supports, for instance, technologies that
substitute business travels by modern commu-
nication devices. In conclusion, economic de-
pressions appear to positively influence inno-
Fig. 1 Reciprocal causal relationships between economic crisis and innovativeness
Wechselseitige Kausalbeziehungen zwischen Wirtschaftskrise und Innovativität
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vativeness, being the midwives of serious think-
ing and the start of revolutionary innovations.
Firms cut cost also by entering new ventures.
This, however, is countered by a second set of
arguments, which tell that mainly a thriving econ-
omy allows firms to increase investment in R&D
(‘demand pull’ hypothesis; Swann 2009). A rise
in innovation activities relates positively espe-
cially to the growth of employment, export in-
tensity and profits, overall to growing demand in
the main sectors of operation (Brower and
Kleinknecht 1999). In turn, economic depres-
sion and demand reduction diminish and hamper
corporate innovativeness and R&D. The escalat-
ing scarcity of finance from banks and (venture
capital) investors, who become more risk-averse,
aggravates the trend (The Economist 2009b;
OECD 2009a). Consequently, economic de-
pression, apart from stimulating innovativeness,
at the same time also obstructs it. Some data re-
lating to the current crisis confirm the paradoxi-
cal co-existence of counter-moving dynamics:
Many corporate reports for the fourth quarter of
2008 show a decline or slower growth in R&D
spending, with similar trends forecasted for 2009.
Yet, a recent McKinsey survey of 500 large busi-
nesses world-wide indicated that 34 % expect to
spend less on R&D in 2009, whereas 21 % fore-
cast an increase (OECD 2009a: 6). Below we
suggest how a geographer’s view helps to under-
stand such contradicting evidence.
Before, we briefly look at implications of pre-
ceding economic downturns for innovative-
ness. Learning from these examples, however,
is not easy since each earlier crisis bears spe-
cific features which distinguish it from the
most recent one. The Asian currency crisis of
1998-99, for instance, hit mostly less devel-
oped economies with low levels of innovative-
ness and inferior positions in globalised pro-
duction networks. Affected firms searched
rescue by lowering costs rather than boosting
R&D (Wohlmuth 2001). Still, some evidence
shows that this crisis created some positive
influence on technological innovation: An
empirical study of manufacturing firms in
Thailand showed that it raised their awareness
to respond to change through innovation
(Virasa and Tangjitpiboon 2000). But only a
few were able to actually react, due to
weaknesses of the innovation system like lack
of capital, capable human resources, techno-
logical infrastructure, technical consulting and
good management practices. Research on South
Korea confirms that the crisis made firms per-
ceive increased innovation requirements, but
that regional systemic support is necessary in
order to put them into practice (Jo 2005). In
Hongkong and China, needs to encourage cre-
ativity and knowledge orientation were per-
ceived, too (Kamoche 2003; Wei et al. 2007).
The burst of the internet bubble and dot.com
crisis of 2000/01 hurt leading innovator econ-
omies, notably the US. This has induced
changes that partly affected innovativeness;
some leading technology firms amplified their
R&D expenditure during and after the ‘new
economy’ bust (OEDC 2009a). Western Com-
panies concentrated on top-end, high value
adding activities, while high- to medium-level
work experienced a major shift to economies
offering qualified human capital at low cost,
such as India (Fromhold-Eisebith and Eise-
bith 2003). This has eventually changed the
international division of labour and interactive
innovativeness in affected sectors, overall
raising the knowledge content of conducted
activities. The reach of this crisis, however,
was limited and mainly concerned information
technology companies. Dimensions were
quite different from what the global and
European economies go through now. This
crisis impinges on a broad range of different
sectors and relates to banking and finance, pro-
duction, services, knowledge flows and other
processes, shaped by intricate international
interdependencies of economies.
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3.  Crisis, Innovation and Regional
Characteristics – a Conceptual Approach
This paper advocates that a geographical view can
substantially contribute to a convincing analysis
of interacting dynamics of the current crisis and
innovativeness. It explains how differentiated pic-
tures of  innovation-related affectedness emerge
(similar to Aalbers 2009 on the financial crisis
and real estate). This view is rooted in well-es-
tablished assumptions on the crucial importance
of regional contexts and systemic dynamics for
innovativeness (Boschma 2005; Feldman 1994;
Fromhold-Eisebith 2009; Simmie 2003 and
2005). It is even shared by some economists,
who point out the innovation-enhancing powers
of regional clusters and networks (Dolfsma
2008; Swann 2009). The notions of national
and regional innovation systems corroborate
our understanding of innovation-driven devel-
opment as the result of place-specific interde-
pendencies of institutional, economic, social
and political features (Blättel-Mink 2009).
Before we conceptualise relations between the
economic crisis and innovativeness from a
geographical angle, we must concede that rea-
soning cannot reach beyond a certain level of
differentiation here. It will hardly be possible, for
instance, to specify assumptions for various
types of innovations, distinguishing crisis-
related impacts for product versus process in-
novations, management and market innova-
tions; the same applies to distinctions between
basic and applied research. Nor can individual
sectors be addressed in detail, only groups of
industries that bear pertinent similarities. Rele-
vant distinctions, however, will be taken into
account as far as possible when tackling cen-
tral questions: Why do we expect the recent
economic crisis to interact differently with
innovativeness in different regions? And which
factors determine whether a region and the
companies locating there react positively to the
crisis in terms of innovativeness, whereas
others are largely negatively affected? In this
context, a region is understood according to both
its structural and functional definitions, hence as
a spatial unit below the national level that is
marked by some homogeneity of industrial struc-
ture and/or a space of dense functional links be-
tween economy-related actors (Wolf 2002).
In support of the assumption that ‘geography
matters’, two main arguments are put forward,
representing a structure- and a system-based per-
spective. First, since the link between economic
depression and innovativeness varies between
different types of firms, the structural composi-
tion of regional economies and the prevalence of
certain categories of companies lead to region-
specific patterns of impact. Second, regions are
home to particular systemic connections
between various actor groups and institutional
features, based on advantages of proximity, which
cause innovation-related developments to be in-
dividually shaped in each regional case (Bosch-
ma 2005; Fromhold-Eisebith 2009; Simmie
2003). These two perspectives form the basic
scaffolding of our concept (see Fig. 2). Addition-
ally, influences from other spatial scales must be
accounted for. This refers to the integration of
regional firms in wide-reaching business connec-
tions which subjects them to forces of globali-
sation. Aspects of structure (some types of firms
are more internationalised than others) and system
play a role here (relating to the interplay of ‘local
buzz and global pipelines’ in knowledge creation;
Bathelt et al. 2004). The national policy frame-
work matters, too (for some countries, such as
Germany, this is combined with the influential
level of the federal states).
3.1 Relevance of regional structure
Addressing aspects of industrial structure, vari-
ous dimensions can be named that determine, on
the one hand, whether a company’s innovation
behaviour make it robust and flexible or vulnera-
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ble towards the recent crisis, and, on the other
hand, whether its innovativeness is positively or
negatively affected. Sectors appear to be quite
important in this regard. Some types of indus-
tries have actually not felt much demand reduc-
tion during 2009, displaying a certain ‘crisis resist-
ance’ that potentially translates also into robust
innovation activities. This applies, at least for the
case of this crisis, to the range of consumer goods
industries, whereas investment goods produc-
ers – from trucks to machinery – experienced
significant drops in sales (IWD 2010). Some
studies suggest that high export dependencies
add to a high vulnerability of those sectors
against crisis effects which translates into re-
gional effects (BBSR 2009). The latter, how-
ever, generally show higher R&D intensities than
the former (Eurostat 2009), and their innovative-
ness may therefore be specifically affected by
the demand slump and share devaluation. Certain
industries typically use crises as innovation
stimulus, like leading information technology
and electronics firms. For them business is like
running a ‘digital sashimi shop’ – products must
swiftly get to the market before they lose their
freshness (The Economist 2010b: 56). Others
are now virtually forced to innovate in order to
stay alive, such as car producers who shift to-
wards electric vehicle technologies.
Whether some sectors are more distressed than
others and if this stimulates positive or negative
outcomes depends on additional factors. Firm
size is one: many small, innovative service
Fig. 2 Determinants of region- specific interaction between economic crisis and innovativeness
Determinanten der regionsspezifischen Interaktion zwischen Wirtschaftskrise und Innovativität
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firms are hit particularly hard due to the intangi-
ble nature of their primary asset (an idea or a pa-
tent), which reduces their creditworthiness; a sub-
stantial reduction of venture capital availability
enhances the problem (OECD 2009a).
Accordingly, the credit crunch hits the innovation
capacities of small firms the most (The Econo-
mist 2009b; Kanerva and Hollanders 2009). The
stock of knowledge of these firms suffers early,
too, when they must lay off highly qualified em-
ployees (they hardly have others) because of fi-
nancial difficulties. Yet, there are exceptions to
this, for instance, in the case of small, however
world-leading service or goods providers that
occupy highly specific market niches.
Medium- to large-sized firms, especially multi-
national companies, can, on average, withstand
more easily crisis-related pressure by resorting
to their capital reserves or balancing activities
in their international network of branches. When
they are forced to reduce employment, this
probably hits lower qualified staff first, which
tends to raise the firm’s qualification level at lo-
cations in advanced economies. Valuable human
capital is kept in the company (with the help of
labour market policy schemes), because after the
crisis, these people will be in high demand again.
Now there is also more idle time for attending
further education courses or for engaging in
think tank activities. New ideas for tomorrow’s
innovations can be created which help to leave old
trajectories (Akgun et al. 2006) and orient to-
wards new challenges, such as ‘greening’ (OECD
2009d). Hence, there are good chances that these
players take the crisis as an encouragement to in-
novativeness, an opportunity to gain in competi-
tive advantage and market leadership.
Innovation strategies, which are often sector-
specific, interfere with the above-mentioned
aspects. Some companies plan innovation
objectives and R&D expenditure many years
ahead (e.g. in the pharmaceutical or biotechnol-
ogy industries). Or competition has been so
hard for years that no player can afford any re-
duction in innovation efforts (like in the elec-
tronics industries). Here R&D spending is hard-
ly affected by the crisis (Kanerva and Hollan-
ders 2009), besides the possibility of a short-
term statistical rise of R&D intensity (R&D
spending as a share of turnover) in the case of
shrinking corporate sales. In other sectors, ef-
forts are being re-oriented towards short-term,
low-risk innovations, while longer-term, high-
risk projects are cut (OECD 2009a). In detail,
developments depend a lot on individual corpo-
rate risk management. In general, we can expect
innovation strategies to change in the crisis. A
shift towards cost-saving collaborative activi-
ties of several firms seems possible (which
links to the system perspective depicted below),
or a trend towards open innovation, which uses
inputs by customers (Picot and Doeblin 2009).
Maybe there is even a transformation from ‘op-
portunity’ to ‘necessity innovativeness’, in anal-
ogy to drivers of entrepreneurship.
A last structural factor that determines region-
specific patterns of innovativeness in the crisis is
itself associated with levels of entrepreneurship.
While new firm formation is essentially hampered
by the recession, notably in manufacturing indus-
tries, those enterprises which manage to come up
tend to be especially efficient. The changing be-
haviour of venture capitalists in the downturn has
an influence, too. They now prefer to support firms
that are already part of their investment portfolio,
while neglecting new start-ups (OECD 2009a).
Pulling the strings together, the following con-
ceptual assumptions with regard to advanced
(European) economies can be stated: Regions
whose industry structure is marked by high
shares of consumer goods producers, locations
of large multinationals, or sectors with long-term
innovation strategies are expected to be fairly
robust in the crisis, also in terms of R&D. Nega-
tive impacts of the recession on innovativeness
will be particularly high in areas with many small
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knowledge-intensive service companies, espe-
cially those servicing investment good produc-
ers, and concentrations of the latter ones them-
selves. Innovativeness is expected to be en-
couraged by the recession in regions that are
home to various market-leading small or large
(multinational) companies, and regions that rely
on existing efficient young firms rather than on
the founding of new enterprises.
3.2 Relevance of regional systemic qualities
From a geographical viewpoint, systemic features
of regions play a major role for any aspect of eco-
nomic dynamics, including innovativeness.
Recent conceptual debates support assumptions
that certain qualities inherent to regional collec-
tives of agents and mechanisms of interaction
allow some places to recover relatively fast from
setbacks in terms of ‘regional resilience’, and to
develop dynamic capabilities of continuing adapt-
ability (Pike et al. 2010; Simmie and Martin 2010).
This connects our reasoning to the broader tradi-
tion of evolutionary thought in economic geo-
graphy. Another argument that feeds into this dis-
cussion is that spatial proximity matters in inno-
vation dynamics. While this statement general-
ly holds true, additional aspects need to be con-
sidered, like the interference of physical with or-
ganisational, social and institutional proximity,
which determines if co-locating actors foster each
other’s innovation performance (Boschma 2005).
In our context, four main system arenas can be
distinguished which relate to interdependencies
of crisis and regional innovativeness: the pro-
duction system that connects different firms
along the value chain, the financial system of
(venture) capital provision, the innovation sys-
tem composed of actors and institutions that
collectively bring about new products and proc-
esses, and the system of human capital provi-
sion and qualification (see Fig. 2). The systems
view logically links to the structure-related view
explained above, since some industries and types
of firms are particularly inclined to embed in (lo-
cal) networks of relationships (like, for instance,
knowledge-intensive business service providers
or manufacturers of complex products like cars).
First, we get to the issue how innovation-related
systemic assets of localities make them more
vulnerable or robust with respect to the crisis.
Disadvantages exist for regions that are marked
by dense connections along the value chain, since
entire local production systems can be affected
when previous innovation trajectories prove to
fail in the crisis (as in the case of large automo-
tive locations). In some cases, however, local
networks of firms may have collectively accu-
mulated and concentrated so much competitive
knowledge that this partly shields them against
the recession (clusters of specialised engineer-
ing firms may serve as an example). This holds true
especially for regions where the innovativeness
of specialised, interconnected industries is sup-
ported by other agents of the innovation system,
notably organisations of basic or applied R&D
(like universities) and technology promotion
agencies dedicated to those sectors. The situation
improves even more when this is accompanied by
a set of banks and other capital providers that are
innovative themselves, inventing financing
schemes that decouple the circulation of money
from detrimental international influences. This
can be done, for instance, by implementing re-
gionalised corporate shareholder schemes that
raise local private investment, also by corporate
employees themselves, for nurturing local indus-
trial development. Considering the role of human
capital and qualification, large stocks of qualified
people who sustain some connection to their (lo-
cal) university of origin guarantee a substantial
amount of flexibility in the crisis, since they pro-
vide a versatile knowledge base and skills that
easily shift between tasks, as requested. It seems
that industrially specialised metropolitan regions
offer the best base for networking dynamics of
these kinds (Brandt et al. 2009).
2011/4             Economic Crisis and Innovativeness – Exploring Geographies of Impacts               385
Second, when looking at the impact of the crisis
on innovativeness, densely-knit local production
systems may come out either as losers or win-
ners. On the one hand, economic contraction re-
duces demand and R&D investment opportunities
for wide parts of the regional economy in these
cases (which sheds more criticism on the clus-
ter orientation in regional development). Nega-
tive implications of proximity in terms of ‘lock-
in’ inhibit flexible reactions (Boschma 2005). A
restrictive behaviour of banks and venture capi-
tal actors further exacerbates the squeeze. When
qualified staff are laid off, this further reduces
firms’ capacities to innovate for some time.
On the other hand, the recession can be expected
to especially encourage R&D collaborations of
firms in a localised production system which
helps them to save costs and expediently com-
bine their value chain specific competences. While
the negative regional implications of cost cuts
in terms of reduced employment, purchasing
power and consumer spending should not be over-
looked, this boosts the efficiency of firms’ inno-
vation strategy and potentially also raises their
willingness to integrate public partners from the
regional innovation system. Anyway, organisa-
tions that constitute a well-established innovation
system can be expected to eagerly take up the
crisis challenge in order to join forces for the sake
of regional recovery. Pre-existing links between
included local actors form an important pre-
requisite for these co-operative efforts, since
trust scores high in collective innovativeness
(Murphy 2006). Manpower-intensive links that
draw on qualification-based connections, like
those that keep alumni of the same university
united, can substantially promote such process-
es. Crisis-related unemployment even raises uni-
versity enrolment (as proven for colleges in the
USA; The Economist 2009a), which enriches the
human capital base for sustaining future innova-
tiveness. Some impact of academic unemploy-
ment on technology-based (spin-off) entrepre-
neurship could be instigated, too. In a crisis, new
firms face opportunities for filling niches as oth-
er players on the spot weaken and open space for
new entrants (OECD 2009a). Co-locating firms
that have previously not done business together
may also profit from advantages of proximity,
since the pressure under which all of them oper-
ate encourages cross-over innovativeness involv-
ing different sectors, possibly also supported by
local R&D partners like a university.
Summing up, reasoning suggests that regions
which possess well-developed systemic qualities
based on personal networks interact positively
with the crisis in terms of innovativeness, bearing
high resilience and good response capacities. This
reflects earlier writings on the favourable proper-
ties of a depression trigger, which sets a particu-
lar stimulus to firms and other actors to increase
collaborative efforts for activating the regional
‘creative-innovative milieu’ (Fromhold-Eisebith
2004). Systemic cohesion, however, has to go in
line with the willingness and capabilities of sys-
tem actors to move ahead in evolutionary ways.
3.3 Regional implications of national
and global frameworks
No region responds to the crisis independently of
national or international influences. This refers
foremost to the integration of resident companies,
notably subsidiaries of multinational corporations,
in national and global value chains, contexts of
organisation and finance, and the international di-
vision of labour, all of which link to innovation
processes. Policies at the national and, in some
cases, federal state levels interfere with that. It is
essentially globalisation which has caused the cur-
rent crisis and injected it into national and regional
economies via intricate international financial
connections causing a widespread credit crunch.
Just as the “understanding of the financial crisis is
ultimately a spatialised understanding of the link-
ages between local and global” (Aalbers 2009: 34),
the same applies to the understanding of inter-
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dependencies between crisis and innovativeness. In
some localities, actors react differently to global
challenges with respect to innovation strategies than
in others. Both structural and systemic features of
regional economies explain why.
Many consider the global reach of the current
crisis as an impediment to innovativeness. As the
OECD (2009a) states, the sharp decline in trade,
foreign direct investment and access to interna-
tional financing poses a risk to the global sup-
ply chains that underpin innovation and are crit-
ical sources of new knowledge and learning.
Companies no longer receive the technical ex-
pertise, market knowledge, critical business con-
tacts and international partners as before, which
could negatively affect knowledge transfer and
innovation. Translated into geographical terms
this insinuates that spatial concentrations of glo-
bally integrated firms suffer most (in some way
supported by BBSR 2009). Rising international
competition and takeover risks, however, drive
established firms to test their own survival skills
which encourages, rather than undermines, their
innovativeness (The Economist 2010a: 12).
Whether the innovativeness of industrial agglo-
merations in advanced economies interacts pos-
itively or negatively with the crisis highly de-
pends on their competitive situation in the glo-
bal economy. If innovation processes previous-
ly located here can be substituted by cheaper
R&D services elsewhere in the international val-
ue chain, for instance in Asia (like in the case of
information technology or pharmaceutical sec-
tors), this will imply a reduction of activities in
the highly developed Western region (From-
hold-Eisebith and Eisebith 2003). This virtual-
ly affects all regional system arenas and poten-
tially restricts localised innovation capabilities
for long. The crisis thus accelerates structural
changes which advancing industrial economies
are experiencing anyway (OECD 2009b). Cost-
sensitive activities become relocated in terms of
nearshoring and offshoring, while industrial
leaders increasingly concentrate on higher-end
steps in the innovation process. This means less
amount of R&D on the spot, but possibly a higher
sophistication of tasks. If resident firms possess
superior highly specific knowledge that is firmly
embedded in their organisation, employees, and
local networks with partners, they will even be
able to profit from the crisis. They can provide cru-
cial inputs to firms in other countries, notably in
emerging economies. Companies there need to
build up and complement their own surging inno-
vation activities (for instance, by buying essential
patent licences) and have basically been much less
distressed by the crisis than Western economies.
In this depression national frameworks of public
finance and policy intervention have been more
influential than in any international crisis before
(Krugman 2008). Many public organisations and
(partly) state-owned banks have incurred heavy in-
vestment losses themselves. Sizeable rescue pack-
ages had to be issued by authorities for saving ma-
jor banks. This public money cannot be spent for
other purposes, such as R&D or higher education.
Ministries can therefore no longer foster
technology-oriented entrepreneurship or (colla-
borative) innovation as before, mainly at the ex-
pense of regions where those activities have tend-
ed to concentrate. When support schemes were
launched years ago, designated funds do not sud-
denly fade in the crisis. There may, however, be
consequences of reduced innovation support budg-
ets for coming periods now in the planning stage.
Stimulus packages and programs to boost public in-
vestments in OECD countries have mainly target-
ed infrastructure projects and labour-intensive sec-
tors (like construction), which bear little impact on
innovativeness. There are, however, also targeted
innovation-related efforts to modernise commu-
nication infrastructure, encourage science and
R&D, augment human capital, promote green tech-
nologies and energy-efficiency, and support cor-
porate innovation and entrepreneurship (BMBF
2009; OECD 2009a). Such programs tend to favour
regions already well-endowed with R&D.
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4. Geographies of Crisis and Innovativeness –
First Empirical Traces
Only anecdotal evidence of the depicted concep-
tual assumptions can be produced so far. There are
studies that derive overarching insights on crisis-
innovation interdependencies (Archibugi and
Filipetti 2011), some of them using survey data
(Kanerva and Hollanders 2009), but do not ac-
count for regional differentiation. Others discuss
regional implications of the crisis (like BBSR
2009), but do not refer to the crucial role of in-
novation. A major hurdle for any attempt towards
analysing relevant relationships is that data on
innovation indicators suffer from a particularly
long time lag to publication. The latest EU report
on science, technology and innovation (Eurostat
2011) draws on 2008 data, with regional figures
relating to no later than 2007. The youngest Re-
gional Innovation Scoreboard for Europe issued
in December 2010 uses data from up to 2006
(Hollanders et al. 2009). The Global Innovation
Index 2009-2010 (INSEAD and CII 2010) only
regards the national level, putting Iceland on a sur-
prising top rank (apparently, recommended
strategies have worked even before being pub-
lished; OECD 2009c). It is therefore impossible
to use these sources for systematically analysing
correlations between crisis affectedness and
innovativeness on the regional scale.
In principle, the question of how to actually meas-
ure impact and by which indicators is not easy to
solve. Two examples may serve to illustrate this.
For Germany, a slight reduction in overall patent
applications of 4.5 % has been recorded for 2009,
while the state of Saxony alone has seen a remark-
able increase of 17 % (DPMA 2010). But do pat-
enting changes actually represent innovation dy-
namics (as also assumed in OECD 2009a)? For
Germany as a whole, reductions may mainly be
caused by cost-reducing corporate behaviour (sav-
ing on expensive patent filings), while R&D ef-
forts have remained unchanged or even grown
(Stifterverband 2010). In Saxony the growth of
new locations of large multinational firms which
generally submit the majority of patent applica-
tions may have caused the surge without any log-
ical link to crisis implications. Data on changing
R&D intensities are, in principle, equally difficult
to evaluate, since the crisis can cause the paradox-
ical phenomenon of rising figures based on shrink-
ing sales rather than increasing R&D expenditure.
Surveys conducted in 2008-2009 by industrial
associations offer a first glimpse on actual crisis
effects on innovativeness, returning to the
German example. The apex of all Chambers of
Commerce and Industry, DIHK, for instance, reg-
ularly captures aspects of companies’ innovation
behaviour (DIHK 2008 and 2009). According to
both investigations, the crisis bears more con-
structive than destructive impact so far. The lat-
est survey (summer 2009; DIHK 2009) tells that
almost half of the responding 1,100 firms have
been changing their innovation strategy in the
face of the crisis. Among surveyed medium-
sized firms (up to 1,000 employees), 30 % raise
their innovation efforts (mostly the R&D inten-
sive ones), while just 5 % reduce them. Many
have now started to critically reflect on and reo-
rient innovation strategies. This translates into a
favourable situation especially for regions that
host big shares of such companies. Locations of
large firms (> 1,000 employees), in contrast, face
more difficult times, since 18 % of respondents
in this class postpone innovation projects and
15 % completely cancel them, while just 17 %
report increasing engagement in R&D. Sector dif-
ferences become obvious too, since some sectors
are much more offensive (chemical industry) than
others (automotive industry). For altogether 30 %
of the respondents access to funds for innovation
projects is bad or has diminished, predominantly
affecting smaller companies. 17 %, however, have
gained better access to finance.
Regional investigations that allow for assessing
place-specific interdependencies of crisis and
innovativeness are still scarce. A study by the
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Chamber of Commerce of Cologne, Germany,
for instance, reveals a comparatively favourable
situation of this agglomeration in the German
context (survey of 200 firms in summer 2009;
IHK Köln 2009). Almost 60 % of respondents
intend to raise innovation activities in order to
cope with the crisis. This goes in line with a
strengthening of collaborative links, first of all
with customers, suppliers and – to a lesser ex-
tent – with universities and R&D institutes,
mostly those locating in the Cologne region.
Some geographical factors also show effect in
recent figures by other organisations. They in-
dicate growing advances of R&D activities in the
southern states of Germany for 2009-2010
which have always been leading innovators due
to their agglomerating automotive, engineering
and electronics industries (Stifterverband 2010).
5. Conclusions
“Economic crises are historically times of
industrial renewal. Less efficient firms fail
while more dynamic ones emerge and expand.
Creative destruction is an essential engine of
long term efficiency in market economies, and
it intensifies in downturns” (OECD 2009a: 7).
This statement inevitably hints at implications on
a regional level: recessions make agglomerations
of industries rise or fall. This paper argues that
innovativeness significantly shapes the geography
of crisis-induced dynamics, both as a factor that
determines the affectedness of regional econo-
mies and as a process field that is itself influenced
by the depression. The depicted concept attempts
to clarify major transmission mechanisms (re-
gional structure and systems) and aspects that mat-
ter in this regard. Yet, this only represents a first
step towards gaining a more palpable picture of
relevant place-specific interdependencies which
should be based on sound empirical verifications
of conceptual assumptions. In the end, we there-
fore need to point out the tasks ahead.
Since official statistics will provide us with
crisis-related data on regional innovation indi-
cators only in a few years, original empirical
research will be needed that targets crucial fac-
ets of the individual and collective innovation
behaviour of regional organisations. Some
guiding questions are: How do industrial sec-
tors and firms of different size classes actual-
ly differ in their innovation response to the cri-
sis, comparing the situation in different re-
gions? Which systemic constellations of co-
locating companies, R&D organisations, fi-
nance and human capital providers in detail
prove to produce collective innovativeness that
helps to withstand negative crisis effects and
generate positive reactions? In which respects
does the crisis trigger the emergence of new
radical innovations, hence actually the start of
a new Kondratieff wave? And, finally, how does
the shift of innovation activities towards emer-
ging (Asian) economies intervene with regional
innovativeness in advanced Western econo-
mies? Only collective research can succeed in
tackling all these crucial issues.
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Summary: Economic Crisis and Innovativeness –
Exploring Geographies of Impact
In contrast to financial and production-related im-
plications of the recent economic crisis, interde-
pendencies of depression and innovativeness have
received little attention by academic scholars so
far. Since innovation is increasingly perceived as a
place-specific and context-dependent process, a
geographical view offers good explanations why
some regions are expected to gain in the crisis in
terms of innovativeness while others rather lose.
The paper explores, mainly from a conceptual
angle, regional differences in interdependencies
between the crisis and innovativeness in advanced
economies. It addresses two directions of causal
relations: In which respects are regional economies
vulnerable or resistant in the face of the crisis, due
to their specific constellations of innovativeness?
And how does the crisis, in turn, affect regional
innovativeness, which may be subject to both ham-
pering and encouraging forces? Arguments that
‘geography matters’ are elaborated by referring to
two perspectives, one taking account of regional
structure in terms of industry composition, and an-
other one considering region-specific systemic qual-
ities. Conceptual assumptions are supported by an-
ecdotal evidence and recent studies on new trends
in corporate innovation behaviour.
Zusammenfassung: Wirtschaftskrise und Innovativität –
zur Geographie der Wirkungszusammenhänge
Im Gegensatz zu finanz- und produktionsbezogenen
Implikationen der aktuellen Wirtschaftskrise haben
Zusammenhänge von Depression und Innovativität
bislang in akademischen Kreisen wenig Aufmerk-
samkeit erfahren. Da Innovation zunehmend als
ortsspezifischer und kontextabhängiger Prozess ver-
standen wird, bietet eine geographische Sicht gute
Erklärungsansätze dafür, warum einige Regionen
voraussichtlich in der Krise an Innovativität gewin-
nen, während andere eher verlieren. Dieser Beitrag
exploriert mit vorwiegend konzeptionellem Fokus
regionale Unterschiede des Zusammenhangs von
Krise und Innovativität in Industriestaaten. Zwei
Richtungen von Kausalbeziehungen werden ange-
sprochen: Inwiefern sind Wirtschaftsräume ver-
wundbar oder widerstandsfähig in Anbetracht der
Krise, gemäß ihrer spezifischen Konstellationen von
Innovativität? Und wie beeinflusst im Gegenzug die
Krise die regionale Innovativität, die sowohl hem-
menden als auch anspornenden Kräften ausgesetzt
ist? Die Annahme, dass geographische Aspekte
bedeutsam sind, wird gestützt auf zwei Perspekti-
ven erläutert, zum einen in Bezug auf regionale
Strukturmerkmale und Branchenzusammensetzung
und zum anderen hinsichtlich regionsspezifischer
systemischer Eigenheiten. Konzeptionelle Überle-
gungen werden untermauert durch Einzelberichte
und jüngere Studien zu aktuellen Trends des unter-
nehmerischen Innovationsverhaltens.
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Résumé: La crise économique et l’innovativité –
sur la géographie des impacts
Contrairement aux implications financières et pro-
duction-connexées de la crise économique récente,
les interdépendances de la dépression et l’innovation
ont suscité peu d’attention par les disciples scolaires
jusqu’ici. Puisque l’innovation est de plus en plus
perçue comme processus endroit-spécifique et con-
texte-dépendant, une vue géographique offre de
bonnes explications pourquoi on s’attend à ce que
quelques régions gagnent dans la crise en termes
d’innovation tandis que d’autres perdent plutôt. Ce
papier explore, principalement d’un angle concep-
tuel, des différences régionales dans les interdépen-
dances entre la crise et l’innovation dans des écono-
mies avancées. Il adresse deux directions des rela-
tions causales: Dans quels respects les économies
régionales sont-elles vulnérables ou résistantes face
à la crise, à base de leurs constellations spécifiques
d’innovation? Et comment la crise, à l’inverse, affecte-
t-elle l’innovation régionale, qui peut être sujette à
tous les deux qui entravent et à des forces d’une
manière encourageante? Arguments que ‘la géogra-
phie importe’ sont élaborés en se rapportant à deux
perspectives, une qui prend en compte de la structure
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régionale en termes de composition industrielle, et
une autre vu des qualités systémiques région-
spécifiques. Des prétentions conceptuelles sont
soutenues par la preuve anecdotique et les études
récentes sur de nouvelles tendances dans le com-
portement de corporation d’innovation.
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